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Question 
What options have been used to structure donor-funded technical assistance facilities to support 
investments and the investment environment in low and middle-income countries?   
Provide examples and lessons from technical assistance facilities which support investment for 
growth, jobs and inclusion. 
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1. Overview 
Donor funded technical assistance (TA) in support of investment climate and investments tend to 
be focused on two delivery mechanisms: through Trust Funds with International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) and through private consultancy firms.  Additional approaches include applied 
research and think-tanks, networks, non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and United Nations 
(UN) agencies.   
Donor engagement in the private sector has grown in recent years for multiple reasons.  In 
financial terms, the IFIs and multinational and bilateral Development Financing Institutions (DFIs) 
dominate flows.  A significant proportion of technical assistance is directly linked to these flows, 
helping build markets but also to manage risks of their associated investments.   
There are a range of sectors from which to draw examples.  This note has been organised by 
technical assistance with a focus on technical assistance that is delivered by agencies that also 
are sources of investment; and technical assistance delivered by private or not-for-profit 
agencies without a direct financial investment role.   
This rapid review was based on publicly available documents.  Given the recent increased donor 
investment into supporting increased investment flows, many of the examples are recent and 
reflect donor and implementers reports, and in-house and third-party evaluations.  Lessons and 
evaluations are emerging from the sector, albeit mostly focused on the investments themselves 
rather than the technical assistance.  Clear attribution remains a challenge.  Literature that looks 
more deeply at impact in terms of poverty and gender is limited.  Although there was some effort 
to search in other (European) languages, the results reflect a likely English-language bias.  There 
are also significant variations in term of what different donors and IFIs publish, especially where 
these include evaluations and post-implementation reports. 
As an overview of technical assistance linked to investment: 
o Most technical assistance is provided along-side financing by the same institution/financing 
mechanism.    
o However, there are an increasing number of examples of technical assistance which are 
more open, supporting bankable projects, or seeking improved returns in both publicly and 
privately-owned enterprises. 
o Donor funded technical assistance managed through IFIs or DFIs tends to be targeted at 
their comparative advantage of improving the investment climate and leveraging the 
financing these organisations bring (including enabling investments into higher risk context, 
more inclusive investments, increased resilience) 
o Donor funded technical assistance through the private consultancy firms tends to be more 
open in term of the resources it seeks to leverage (from IFIs, bilateral investors including 
non-OECD sources, private sector). 
o Other mechanisms such as supporting networks, policy research, information sharing, are 
used.  These clearly can add value, although face challenges demonstrating attributable 
results. 
o Many interventions are risky, with technical assistance seen as a way of helping reduce this 
risk although this is seldom measured in terms of actual risk reduction. 
o It’s not always clear that donor support is robustly tested against increasing socio-economic 
benefits and market failure, combined with financial viability.   
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As key lessons that emerge from the review: 
o Politics and people matter.  At a high level, political buy-in and seeking to build a 
constituency to support that political buy-in is often a key challenge. This is similar to buy-in 
at the top of companies and groups of companies.  Similarly, the right people to deliver 
matter, often local and regional experts can be more effective, but being able to bring in 
international specialists is also highly relevant. 
o All models require a degree of donor engagement, often more than anticipated.  Used 
carefully, bilateral donors can have political comparative advantages over IFIs and especially 
with consultancy firms.  With technical aspects being the main comfort zone, allocating time 
and stepping up political economy understanding is often needed.  In some cases, this may 
mean stepping back and waiting for the right time, in other cases it means significant time 
investment. 
o Technical assistance can add value.  It can unblock processes, build trust, help decision 
makers priorities, build capacity and strategic focus.  However, it will often depend on having 
the right people at the right time, which can be partly addressed through adaptable designs 
and rapid response capacity. 
o Measuring additionality is challenging; this can be partially managed through ex ante 
efforts by implementing partners to identify probable specific outcomes and impact and then 
follow through as during and after implementation1. 
o Doing no harm, or reducing harm perhaps needs increased understanding.  There are 
good examples of helping avoid poor investment decisions by governments where easy 
credit and ambitious promises are not supported by evidence in the ground.  Donor support 
that leads to reduced corruption associated with support to investment does not appear much 
in the technical assistance literature outside direct anti-corruption programmes – the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is perhaps a good example in this area. 
o The tension between growth and inclusion remain a challenge.  A number of evaluations 
are positive about development impact (and presumably associated growth).  As noted by 
ICAI 2014, 2017), evidence of inclusion is generally more challenging, and mostly limited to 
very targeted programmes that are explicitly about gender impact and/or poverty reduction 
and which tend to be on smaller scales. 
2. Conceptual justification for donor support to the private 
sector 
The economic rationale for donor support to the private sector lies with market failure.  Due to 
multiple reasons (imperfect information, externalities leading to market preferences being 
different from social preferences, very limited capital resources), there is a case for public (donor) 
funds.  As Carter (2015 pg iv), notes, the case for subsidising private sector investment in 
developing countries is based largely on the economic theory of positive externalities: the idea 
that the benefits from investment that accrue to society at large exceed the returns to private 
investors.  In the case of technical assistance, it is also arguably about imperfect information, as 
                                                   
1 A good description of challenges and lessons can be found in Heinrich M, 2013.  Donor Partnerships with 
Business for Private Sector Development:  What can we Learn from Experience?  DCED. https://www.enterprise-
development.org/wp-
content/uploads/DCEDWorkingPaper_PartnershipsforPSDLearningFromExperience_26Mar2013.pdf  
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risks can be hard to assess (leading to lower than ideal investments as investors are mostly risk-
adverse) and knowledge transfer/reducing the costs of innovation. 
3. Delivering through International Financial Institutions 
and Development Financial Institutions 
Major multinational Banks 
Most IFIs provide technical advice to governments with the aim of improving the investment 
environment.  Some also provide support to the private sector. 
The World Bank Group (World Bank and International Finance Corporation - IFC) focus on 
both investment climate and more concrete business delivery technical assistance.  The World 
Bank’s focus includes analytical and advisory services, often linked to lending and budget 
support with a focus on investment climate.  Where not directly funded and linked to loans and 
credits, it is generally funded through trust funds or reimbursable advisory services.  The IFC 
provides stand-alone advisory services, with defined products and tend to focus on concrete, 
short-term and rapid interventions.   This is both investment climate related (often funded by 
donor trust funds) and investment specific technical assistance linked to IFC investments. 
The Inter-American Bank (IDB) provides support to the investment climate as part of its credit 
provision.  In private sector technical assistance more specifically, its main delivery is through 
IDBInvest2, providing equity and loans to the private sector (which will have associated technical 
assistance as an investor) and also separate technical assistance funded through trust funds and 
internal resources.  This additional technical assistance covers a range of areas, such as specific 
sectoral support, value-chain development, creating opportunities for increased access to 
finance.  
An evaluation of the World Bank Groups interventions (with a focus on investment climate) drew 
the following lessons: 
o Political will was strongly related to success.  Often the investment climate challenges were 
identified as a challenge by the World Bank, while this was not clearly a view shared by 
partner governments. 
o The World Bank carried out considerable diagnostics, however this was more often where 
World Bank activities take place (rather than all aspects of investment climate). 
o It was important to draw on these diagnostic tools during the design of investment climate 
projects as this was not always found to be the case. 
The World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) found that in a review of the World 
Bank/IFC private sector interventions IEG (2016, pg 6), while there is no single prescription for 
catalysing transformational change, there are some mechanisms that increase its likelihood:  
o Identifying and addressing the binding constraints to progress toward a development 
objective  
o Adopting systemic tactics that address multiple constraints in interrelated parts, including 
through cross-sectoral approaches  
                                                   
2 https://idbinvest.org/en/projects  
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o Scaling up and replicating effective approaches and innovations and of novel financing 
instruments  
o Changing behaviours by modifying incentives of beneficiaries, introducing market forces, or 
increasing the flow of information.  
Trust Funds delivered through IFIs 
A Trust Fund is the main mechanism through which bilateral donors “buy” IFI services to deliver 
specific agreed objectives.  Two examples: 
The Asia Pacific Project Preparation Facility (AP3F) is a multi-donor fund managed by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) which provides technical support to governments leading to 
Public-Private partnerships, this includes: Project preparation and structuring, capacity 
development and policy reform, and project monitoring and restructuring support. Less usual in 
other IFI models, it includes a fee payment for successful financing deals, providing internal 
incentives as well as alternative sources of funds from donor grants (ADB 2014).  Set up in 2016, 
a total of 11 applications for technical assistance had been approved by end 2017 (ADB 2017). 
Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) is a multi-donor funded managed by 
the World Bank.  Its focus is on supporting private investment into key infrastructure, often under 
public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements.  An evaluation of 15 years of investment in 
Nigeria (PPIAF 2016) concluded that: 
o In the sector (eg: ports) where clear success, there had been strong stakeholder 
management and participation, clear communication, focussed government leadership 
o In the sectors where delivery was much weaker (energy, water), these were not present 
leading to necessary but not sufficient reforms and regulation that would lead to effective 
impact. 
Technical assistance programmes in place with Development 
Finance Institutions 
Of multilateral DFIs, the IFC is the most active in terms of managing Trust Funds that include 
investment climate and sectoral approaches as well as more specific advisory services to 
structure investments and financing. 
Bilateral DFIs are also a mechanism through which technical assistance is delivered. All four of 
the largest bilateral DFIs3 provide technical assistance that is additional to their main investment 
objectives, although in practise this technical assistance will mostly be with prospective clients. 
Netherlands FMO – Entrepreneurial Development is by some measures the largest bilateral DFI 
with an investment portfolio of EUR €9.2 billion.  It implements a Capacity Development 
Programme: technical assistance to build growth of businesses from financial, environmental and 
socially sustainable way.  Fifty percent of the costs are covered by the specific business, and 
since 2015 the focus has been on “green and gender” (FMO 2017).  Delivery models include 
external advisory services and partnerships with the business, as well as facilitating exchange 
experiences with similar businesses and specific courses, seminars and workshops.  Over ten 
                                                   
3 As defined by OECD 
https://public.tableau.com/views/NONODA_DFIs/DFIs_EN?:embed=y&:display_count=no?&:showVizHome=no#
1  
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years covering over 500 projects and at a cost of EUR €52 million (funding including the clients 
contribution), additionally catalysed funds are estimated to be EUR €100 million (FMO 2017a). 
French Proparco is the DFI set up in 1977, and an agency of the French Cooperation Agency 
(AFD).  Drawing on AFC resources, it implements two technical assistance funds: 
o An investments and support fund. Focused on building capacity and improving performance 
of especially SMEs and financial institutions.  This includes organisational diagnostics, 
targeted advisory support, as well as assistance to set up investment funds for companies 
within the portfolio. 
o Governance capacity building:  this second fund works with AFD partners (Proparco and 
other AFD cooperation), providing specific diagnostics, technical assistance, seeking 
financing options.  For this support, 25% of the cost is normally expected from the client. 
The German government DFI (DEG) provides tailored Business Support Services (BSS). This 
is non-repayable co-financing for eligible projects that help companies to improve their 
performance, growth and developmental impact.  Both prospective and existing customers are 
eligible.  Areas of support include4: 
o Resource and energy efficiency advisory services 
o Corporate governance advisory services 
o People management 
o Environmental and Social Management in the Financial Sector 
o SME Advisory Programmes for Financial Institutions 
The UK CDC has historically not drawn on ODA funds to provide technical assistance (Velde and 
Warner 2007).   However, the DFID funded Impact Programme approved in 2012, with the 
capital fund element formally transferred to the CDC balance sheet in 2017.  The CDC has an 
ODA (DFID) funded technical assistance (CDC Plus)5 supporting investee companies, 
suggesting this element of the Impact Programme technical assistance will continue to be 
implemented by CDC6.  With these changes it is unclear what lessons can be drawn, however 
they may offer insights in the future.    
Although these apply to a multilateral DFI (IFC), summary findings of an evaluation of IFC 
advisory services (IEG 2011) is likely to also broadly apply to bilateral DFIs.  The evaluation of 
the IFC advisory services concludes that around 70% have achieved high development ratings7.   
And lessons include: 
o The capacity gap between provider and recipient impacts on absorptive capacity, where 
weaker, more challenging. 
o Transfer of knowledge can be more effective when the overall development level of country 
of the source (provider) is closer to that of the recipient country. 
o Strong commitment and presence on both sides leads to improved outcomes 
                                                   
4 https://www.deginvest.de/International-financing/DEG/Unsere-Lösungen/Begleitmaßnahmen/ 
5 https://www.cdcgroup.com/en/how-we-invest/how-we-partner-with-businesses/adding-value/ 
6 The ImpactProgramme http://www.theimpactprogramme.org.uk  
7 This primarily means impacting positively on investment decisions, rather than eg: job creation. 
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o Broader relationships (eg: also provision of other services, financing) support knowledge and 
technical advice transfer 
o Codified and explicit knowledge is easier to transfer. 
 
As an evolution of DFIs, a number of investment funds have been set up.   
Especially in Africa where job creation and food security are given high priority, these have 
focused on agri-businesses though they have expanded into other income generating 
opportunities such as renewable energy8.   
The US$246 million African Agriculture Fund (AFF) offers an example of a private, public and 
not-for-profit delivery.  The fund itself blends private and development finance investors (DFIs), 
with a subsidiary SME fund for smaller agri-business investments.  Each fund is managed by 
different private equity firms.   
A separate, donor (primarily European Union - EU) funded, technical assistance fund (TAF) 
managed by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and implemented by a 
not-for-profit firm (TechnoServe) services both funds, offering both development services, but 
also helps companies to develop more innovative and inclusive models that lead to commercial 
returns (TechnoServe 2017).  It has a budget of around US$10million over a seven-year period, 
and while it focussed on the companies that AFF invests in, it operates with these same 
companies to help them expand their markets, increase their profits. 
An EU funded review (Smith and Schramm 2017) after five years concluded: 
o Shifting to ensuring the AAF/SME funds did their due diligence first (without TAF support) 
was an important step.  Potential was therefore verified and owned by the equity funds 
themselves.  The TAF then engaged to enhance this potential, working with the companies 
with the knowledge they were already screened as viable.  Technical assistance was then 
also timely given the firms were also benefiting from the equity and loan investments from the 
AAF. 
o It was important to tailor support to difference context, especially the size of the business.  
Micro-firms (<10 employees) benefited most from training and know-how.  Small firms (10-50 
employees) primarily benefited from core TA such as ensuring solid accounting systems and 
potentially build capacity for innovative inclusive approaches.  Medium and larger firms 
where best able to see innovative inclusive approaches, with some tailored capacity building 
technical assistance. 
o Early investment in building high quality suppliers within the region was especially valuable, 
especially those who are able to engage at all levels including with busy CEOs and equity 
managers.  They also had back-up of international expertise where required. 
o Successful management including the ability to learn and adapt, understand local contexts 
vary, be ready to manage challenges of poor uptake, dealing with unrealistic expectations, 
and overcoming communication challenges.    
                                                   
8 Other example would be the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund https://www.aecfafrica.org/about-us/who-we-are  
and AgDevCo https://www.agdevco.com  
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4. Technical assistance that is not directly associated with 
financing mechanisms. 
Delivery through Private Sector Providers 
A significant proportion of technical advice is provided through consultancy firms, including not-
for-profit firms. 
Australian Aid (DFAT) has a long history of using private sector delivery of which a significant 
proportion is through private contractors and so provides a good overview.  Benefiting from a 
systematic evaluation (DFAT 2018), key criteria for increased success included: 
o Facilities allow flexible approaches, adapting to demand and contextual changes. 
o Importance of providing opportunities for outcome-focused coherence across sectors, the 
whole to be bigger than the sum of the parts. 
And other lessons included: 
o Quality delivery depends on being very well managed by DFAT, and which could include 
significant and experienced ‘hands on’ approach. 
o Engagement requires capacity within the facility, and by DFAT, staff to engage, manage, 
optimise results. A major risk is that effort ends up “Transactional rather than transformative”. 
o Unrealistic assumptions are common. 
o Data challenges prevent firm conclusions about efficiencies in managing contractors’ costs; 
although the evaluation concluded no obvious differences from alternative delivery options 
while recognising an area for deeper review. 
o Trust and open communication between delivery agents and DFAT was related to significant 
benefits in terms of results 
o Careful structuring of criteria for management fees is important, so both DFAT and contractor 
incentives are balanced appropriately. 
Effectiveness:  delivery was on average found to be effective once unrealistic design 
assumptions are factored in. 
Efficiency:  contracting out to consultancy firms can help reduce administrative savings, but 
rarely reduced demand in terms of more complex engagement by DFAT staff. 
As more specific examples: 
The Department for International Development (DFID) funded Business Innovation Facility 
(BIF) was a five-year facility, focused on Bangladesh, India, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia, 
providing technical assistance9 and knowledge sharing to support companies to develop 
inclusive businesses.  Both shorter specific technical assistance (eg: workshops, working with 
clusters of companies, average cost £10,000), and longer-term engagement (three to 24 months, 
average costs £45,000) were used as approaches across a range of sectors within the five 
countries.  The lessons drawn from this phase (Ashley et al, 2014) concluded that: 
o Putting together inclusive businesses require more innovation and perseverance that may be 
expected, with multiple pilots and reiterations, depended on well managed and strong 
partnerships. 
                                                   
9 Although BIF did not provide financing, it was able to help fund materials for pilots, testing. 
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o They take time to get right, generally assume a 10-year period from inception to scale. 
o Inclusive businesses can reach underserved markets with low income populations but it’s a 
longer term strategic commercial view rather than rapid commercial results. 
o For larger companies, TA is often not needed.  It’s about getting the timing right, when the 
company is able and seeking to expand, innovate.  Short specific and timely TA can at times 
offer better value for money (vfm) than more intensive support. 
o For smaller companies, the benefits are more about stronger business plans, better financial 
management.  Also in some cases this helped raise finance, others still struggled despite 
being stronger in terms of “bankability”. 
As a complementary lesson learning, the internal DFID Project Completion (DFID 2014a) report 
noted that while overall successful, it was also noted that further lesson learning would be 
relevant to understand why a subsection of firms still struggled to implement agreed processes 
despite significant BIF inputs.   The BIF is now in its second phase, focused on Myanmar 
(Burma), Malawi and Nigeria10.   Although the rationale for the shift in countries from the first 
phase is not covered explicitly (DFID 2014), this appears to be more driven by a commitment to 
increase focus on Fragile and Conflict-Affected countries (FCAS).  BIF2 also increased its focus 
on specific markets and understanding the market prior to engagement. 
Cities and Infrastructure for Growth (CIG) is a £165 million technical assistance investment 
implemented in a portfolio of sub-Saharan and South Asian countries11 focused on infrastructure, 
energy, services that support business and households.  It will target improvements in policies, 
regulation and procedures that can enable investment from the private sector and from 
multilateral and bilateral financial institutions, including DFID’s own development capital 
platforms.  Although working in a similar space to PPIAF (as mentioned above) it is designed to 
be able to work more politically to nurture opportunities on the ground, while PPIAF is considered 
more demand-led.  (DFID 2016) 
Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility (NIAF) is now in a second phase.  Through the 
provision of technical assistance, it focuses on creating conditions for investment for public 
goods (eg: roads and railway, effective cities, energy).  The formative evaluation (ICF 2015) 
noted, inter alia, that key considerations for success included: 
o As a strength it has the right combination of skills in place, including drawing on consultants 
in the diaspora as able to understand the context while bringing in specific skills 
o Potential investor engagement helps lead to resources and higher standards. 
o Political impetus is critical; greater chances of success where working in sectors in clear 
need and so where politicians are incentivised to respond. 
o Institutional clarity, avoiding overlaps and potentially competing interests 
o Whole system approach taken, addressing the entire market chain. 
Ethiopia Investment Advisory Facility (EIAF) is also implemented through a consultancy firm, 
providing demand-driven advice and technical assessment to government-guaranteed or owned 
investments, with a focus on growth and export-related infrastructure (railways, industrial parks, 
state-owned enterprises).  It seeks buy-in through jointly implemented assessments (with state-
owned enterprises) which include counterpart senior buy-in and technical capacity building.  This 
                                                   
10 http://www.bifprogramme.org/where-we-work  
11 Within these two regions, the priority would be countries considered to be fragile and conflict affected States 
(FCAS). 
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in turn aims to lead to better investment decisions and management of investments already 
being implemented.  
The Nepal Centre for Inclusive Growth took a somewhat different evolution, moving from more 
of a policy hub into supporting bankable projects.  This reflected the particular realities and needs 
on the ground, and its flexibility is considered one of the reasons for its success in contributing to 
major investments (hydro-electric, power trade with India).  It shifted to providing rigorous models 
for structuring deals. Key lessons (ICED 2016) included: 
o Flexible design and delivery model.  This allowed space to lesson learn and adapt. 
o A politically aware arm’s length approach.  Implementing partners were given space by DFID, 
however DFID engaged rapidly where political or additional resources were required. 
o Laying the foundations to take advantage of windows of opportunity.  It was through political 
shifts that opportunities emerge. 
The role of networks (and Impact Investing) 
There has been a significant increase in Impact Investing12, commercial and private foundation 
funded investors who like DFIs seek commercially viable investments while impacting positively 
in socio-economic terms, and often seek to bring in innovations which allow both objectives to be 
met.  
However, in terms of the role of donor funded technical assistance, the overlap is limited.  One 
area is through national and international networks. Most have donor and private foundation 
support, though increasingly they seek to be self-financing.  Networks aim to share information 
and lesson learning, improve capacity to measure impact, facilitate investment flows and 
opportunities.  Although clearly valued, there was no readily available evaluation or review of the 
value-added that donor technical funds obtained. 
The Global Impact Investment Network (GIIN)13, is financed by members and also donor 
contributions (DFID provides financial support via IMPACT14).  GIIN is a not-for-profit market 
support network set up in 2009 dedicated to increasing the scale and effectiveness of impact 
investing. It serves as a forum for identifying and addressing the systemic barriers that hinder the 
impact investing industry's efficiency and effectiveness.  
Impact Investors Council – India15 offers an example of a national focus.  It is made up of a 
collective of members and partners, primarily private foundations and impact investors but also 
donors.  It seeks to improve regulations to encourage impact investing, as well as build alliances, 
create opportunities, enable investments within India.  It also aims to be self-sustaining. 
Other networks include: 
                                                   
12 Impact investing can be defined as “investments made into companies, organizations, vehicles and funds with 
the intent to contribute to measurable positive social, economic and environmental impact alongside financial 
returns.” (IFC https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/Impact-
investing/Overview/ ) 
13 https://thegiin.org/imm/  
14 https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202939/documents  
15 http://iiic.in/impact-investors/   
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Business Call to Action (BCtA16):  brings together over 230 private companies, supported by 
various donors and with managed by UNDP. Engaging in innovation, market building, supply 
chains, competitiveness, it seeks to create new opportunities with inclusive and environmentally 
sustainable benefits. 
ANDE (Aspen Network for Development Entrepreneurs17): focus on capacity of small and 
growing businesses with regional and (large country) chapters 
AVCA (African Venture Capital Association):  Promotes and stimulates private equity and 
venture capital investment in Africa 
IBAN (Inclusive Business Action Network18) – global network focussing on supporting 
businesses. 
Political and high-level policy engagement 
Political risks are often highlighted in design and evaluation documents. 
Donor supported political engagement is rarely reported and evaluated on, perhaps as mostly 
carried out by donors.  The examples below do not seek to offer different models through which 
bilateral funds have added-value at a political and high-policy level, especially in terms of 
investment climate improvements.  
One example that benefits from third-party reflections in terms of its value-added is the Viet Nam 
Business Forum.  Through the already established Government of Viet Nam – donor forum, the 
Viet Nam Business Forum was set up in 199719, meeting bi-annually with secretarial and 
technical support from IFC/World Bank and financial support from donors at the start (it is now 
managed by the business themselves, with IFC/World Bank inputs). It represents the main 
domestic and international firms, with working groups covering specific issues with aim of 
improving business, investment, etc. 
A recent review of investment policy in Viet Nam (OECD 2018) noted the value of the Viet Nam 
Business Forum, particularly in the context of period during and following the country’s accession 
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2007 where the Government drew on the engagement 
and advise of the Forum to increase the benefits of the WTO.   Similarly, a US State Department 
(2014) review recognises the value as an important forum through which Government of Viet 
Nam engaged business.   
In Ethiopia, a partnership of businesses supported by German and Dutch funds were successful 
of having laws changed that improved business environment.  The evaluation of this support also 
                                                   
16 https://www.businesscalltoaction.org/business-call-action#  
17 https://www.andeglobal.org  
18 https://www.inclusivebusiness.net  
19 http://vbf.org.vn/about-us/introduction/ 
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noted the active role of the Dutch Embassy in bringing business climate issues to the table 
(Heinrich 2013 pg 39).   
More common, or at least more frequently documented, are the roles of applied policy research, 
through specialised agencies20, research networks, think-tanks.  This mechanism contributes to 
building evidence and in-country capacity.  
The DFID funded International Growth Centre (IGC) is a long-term funding commitment that 
builds up country-level capacity and know-how.  It’s country-based operations arguably function 
as a think-thank as well as part of the wider network, benefiting from direction and additional 
capacity centred at LSE and Oxford universities.  The IGC covers a wide range of challenges 
that are growth-related within the themes of State, Firms, Cities and Energy21.   In the 2017-18 
period, the IGC was involved in 165 projects, of which 29%22 led to a specific policy change or 
decision based on the evidence and engagement with policy makers.   
  
                                                   
20 An example here would be Canadian IDRC, who draw on their own funds as well as other sources to deliver 
research for development, with the aim of bring innovation, knowledge and policy influence.  www.idrc.ca  
21 https://www.theigc.org/research-themes/  
22 https://www.theigc.org/impact/  
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